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Recommendations on NATO–Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe

България, балканите и света  

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

This group of experts from Russia, the United States and Europe held 15 online-seminars on NATO-Russia Risk Reduction in summer and fall of 2020 and offer the following ideas:

To maintain strategic stability, we look forward to immediate action to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years.

At the same time, we are concerned by the deterioration of the European secu­rity situation in recent years. The nuclear and conventional arms control system that took decades to build is rapidly unraveling, with nothing to take its place. Incidents in the course of military activities which bring Russian and NATO forces into close proximity are worrisome in their own right and run the risk of escala­tion. While members of our group differ over the root causes of the crisis, we are concerned that as tension builds between Russia and NATO, a real military con­frontation becomes an increasing danger.

Given this situation, we call upon our countries’ leaders to demonstrate the political will necessary to take a number of urgent actions in order to reduce the risks of military conflict. These military and security actions should be pursued whether or not we make progress in reducing the serious political disputes among our countries. Indeed, these steps can contribute to an atmosphere, in which reso­lution of those difficult political issues becomes more achievable.

We propose a set of measures, recognizing that not all of these steps will be immediately feasible. The detailed recommendations below address the following areas:

- Re-establishing practical dialogue between Russia and NATO, including direct contacts between the military commanders and experts of Russia and NATO member states.
- Developing common rules that will reduce the risk of unintended incidents on land, air and sea.
- Enhancing stability by increasing transparency, avoiding dangerous military activities, and providing dedicated communication channels that would avoid escalation of incidents that might occur.
- Utilizing (and possibly supplementing) the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to codify restraint, transparency and confidence-building measures.
- Exploring possible limitations on NATO and Russian conventional force deployments in Europe to enhance transparency and stability.
- Establishing consultations between Russia and US/NATO on the topics of intermediate-range missiles and ballistic missile defense, in order to pre­vent a new nuclear missile race in Europe.
- Preserving the Open Skies Treaty.

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

1. The need for dialogue  

- Political dialogue should be revitalized at the ambassadorial level in the NATO-Russia Council and include briefings by military experts as appropriate.

- As part of the NATO 2030 reflection process, Russia and NATO member states should analyze relations between NATO and Russia with a view to deve­loping the military-to-military dialogue. At a time when most NATO-Russia coop­eration remains suspended, such a dialogue should not be viewed as a departure from NATO’s “no business as usual” policy, but as a step that is necessary to increase predictability and reduce the risk of military incidents at sea, in the air and on land escalating to the level of military conflict.

- Once Russia and NATO member states reach a formal or informal under­standing or agreement, they could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilat­eral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.

- Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.

- In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.

- Furthermore, NATO member states and Russia should enhance military contacts in OSCE forums to provide a more efficient and inclusive format for dis­cussion and quick decision-making on current issues relating to military activities.

- NATO and Russia should consider the possibility of establishing special NATO-Russia communication channels or hotlines in sensitive regions such as the Baltic, and Black sea regions and the High North area.

- While the recommendations offered in this paper would be developed pri­marily in NATO-Russia channels, a number of them could be opened to discussion with and participation by other countries, such as Sweden and Finland in the Baltic and High North regions, and Ukraine and Georgia in the Black Sea regio

 

2. Preventing incidents

- Prevention of incidents and de-escalation once they have occurred is the most urgent issue related to military interaction. NATO member states and Russia, as well as other European states, need to together formulate a minimum set of realistic measures that could be adopted as formal agreements, informal under­standings or parallel, coordinated steps. While they do not have to be in the form of a legal treaty, they should have real force so as to effectively reduce the level of mutual tension.

- NATO and Russia should develop a single set of common rules that would define minimum distances between military aircraft and ships as well as proce­dures for interaction of crews. To this end, they could resume joint work within the framework of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which had as one of its tasks the strengthening of confidence-building measures along the NATO-Russia line of contact. To address this task, sides should resume a navigational data exchange on the air situation along Russia’s Western border with NATO member states that was already established in the past.

- As one of the options for managing incidents, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agree­ment on Prevention of Incidents at Sea and in the Airspace Above the Sea, as well as 11 similar agreements between certain NATO member states and Russia, could be taken as the basis for additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. Another source of ideas and approaches can be found in the Sino-American agreement of 2014 and Protocol of 2015 on prevention of incidents, which combines principles of prevention of incidents at sea and prevention of incidents during military activities in general.

- Russia and the United States should reach agreement on notification of heavy bomber patrols and flights near the borders of the other side, similar to the notifications they exchange of ICBM and SLBM launches.

- NATO and Russia should develop and adopt standardized procedures for de-escalation of military incidents and conflicts. They should also conduct joint staff training exercises to prepare for de-escalation, create de-confliction mecha­nisms in the Baltic, High North and Black Sea regions, and establish a joint mech­anism similar to the one built up by Russia and the United States in Syria.

 

3.Ensuring stability

- NATO member states and Russia should reaffirm the reciprocal political commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the CFE Final Act (1999) whereby NATO and Russia agree to refrain from additional perma­nent stationing of substantial combat forces in areas close to the territory of the other side in Europe.

- They should explore the possibility of reciprocal constraints or further par­allel unilateral commitments on the size and scope of military activities in contigu­ous areas, or on the level of armed forces permanently located in such areas, with scope wider and thresholds for advance notification and mandatory observation much lower than those required under the 2011 Vienna Document. A focus for such measures could be the Baltic Region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus,Germanyand Poland), including Kaliningrad and Russia’s Western military district.

- NATO member states and Russia should consider including in trans­parency measures land-based and sea-launched conventional intermediate (medium-range) strike systems, such as cruise missiles that may be located outside the contact zones if they can support exercises and military operations in the contact zones.

- They could also draw on the experience with the provisions relating to the inner-German border area contained in the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. That agreement required troops to behave with caution in the border area. The sides could consider the establishment of reciprocal zones in which exercises should not be conducted, e.g. within 5 to 10 kilometers of specified borders, while also limiting personnel and certain kinds of military equipment in such zones.

- Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large-scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders taking into account the specificity of contact zones. They should con­sider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises in near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.

- As for “snap exercises”, which continue to be a source of tension and are not subject to prior notification, we recommend the establishment of a regime of mutual transparency at a high military level between Russia and NATO. To that end, a “quiet notification” mode should be developed, e.g. providing confidential advance high-level notice to the other side, but with no advance warning to troops participating in the exercises. “Quiet notification” could also be applied to short-no­tice transit of multinational forces. An appropriate level for this sort of mutual infor­mation exchange would be the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander
 

4. NATO-Russia Founding Act

- If agreements can be reached between NATO and Russia on additional confidence-building, transparency and restraint measures, these could be incorpo­rated as additional protocols or annexes to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

- NATO and Russia could also agree to definitions of the parameters of the reciprocal measures of restraint mentioned in the Founding Act, such as “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” This could be established as the equivalent of one army brigade and one air wing/regiment per country or Russian military district.

- With the implementation of these additional risk-reduction measures and significant progress in the resolution of broader political differences between NATO and Russia, the sides could agree to draw up a new Code of Conduct for European security, which could also engage other European states beyond NATO and Russia.

 

5. Possible agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe

- Confidence-building measures and possible measures of restraint should provide for effective collective and individual defense for all states in the region, big and small, with a view to enhancing stability and transparency, avoiding surprises, and minimizing risks of escalation. Given that a new conventional arms control treaty does not seem possible or practicable at this time, agreements may take the form of political commitments.

- NATO and Russia should start negotiations to adopt certain measures to limit the arms race in the European region based on the assumption that currently deployed force levels are sufficient. Agreement should be aimed primarily at limiting destabilizing concentrations of forces and military training activities.

- Both sides should consider and discuss the potentially destabilizing capabilities of some precision and long-range conventional weapons with a view to exercising restraint and ensuring transparency in this sphere. They could adopt transparency measures also with respect to conventional strike forces located outside the zone of direct contact of Russia and NATO. This refers to naval forces, long-range aviation and ground-based weapons, not covered by New START, with the range capability to reach this region.

- The measures proposed in this paper should be significantly more far- reaching than the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. They should take into account the experience of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and its adapted version and extend their scope.

- Therefore, we recommend conducting an analysis of the Vienna Document 2011 with a view to extending the scope of its transparency and verification measures and its provisions on large-scale military exercises and other deployments to include naval forces, all large air force and air defense formations, conventional ground-, air- or sea-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as logistic and communication units.

- NATO member states and Russia should practice parallel unilateral arms control measures, coordinating them in advance, where practicable, and reciprocating as appropriate.


6. Missile Defenses and Intermediate Range Missiles in Europe

- Russia and the United States/NATO should hold consultations on missile defense in Europe, both strategic and non-strategic, nuclear and non-nuclear, with a view to increasing transparency and overcoming existing differences.

- They should consider ways to bridge the differences between NATO’s declared intention not to deploy any nuclear-armed ground-based missiles in Europe and Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on nuclear- and conventionally- armed medium-range and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. A first step could be to agree upon reciprocal transparency measures with regard to existing capabilities.

- Russia, the United States and other NATO member states should enhance transparency beyond current capabilities through an annual exchange of ten- year plans for the development of missile defense in Europe, the creation of a data exchange center, and notification of new missile defense elements that have reached operational readiness.
 

6.Open Skies Treaty

- Participants in the dialogue support preserving the Open Skies Treaty as it is one of the few remaining transparency instruments geared to promote confidence­building between states parties in Europe.

- We should focus on the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty for the remaining 33 states parties and on preserving the treaty. All states parties, including Russia, should remain in the Treaty for a sufficient time to assess how it would function in these conditions and to allow time for possible reentry by the United States. Russia and the United States, as well as other states parties, should discuss their concerns about the treaty and try to find agreed solutions.

- Remaining states parties should consider the possibility of joint diplomatic initiatives aimed at returning the United States to the Open Skies Treaty.

 

 

Americans, Europeans and Russians, who signed the statement

Note: Each of the signers of these recommendations agrees
with most but not necessarily all of them.

Affiliations are for purposes of identification only

 

  • Benoit d’Aboville, Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, Vice President of the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), France.
  • James Acton, co-director, Nuclear policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
  • Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, until 2017 Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of Defense;
  • Roy Allison*, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, Director, Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford;
  • Alexey Arbatov, Head, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Nadezhda Arbatova, Head, Department for European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
  • Valeriy Baranov, Colonel General (ret.), Inspector general of the Ministry of Defense.
  • Vladimir Baranovsky*, Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Alexandra Bell*, former Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;
  • Robert Bell*, former assistant to the US President, former counselor to the Secretary General of NATO, distinguished Professor of the Practice, Georgia Tech;
  • John Beyrle, former Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation (2008-2012), former Ambassador to Bulgaria (2005-2008), Chairman of the U.S. Russia Foundation
  • James Bindenagel*, Ambassador (ret.), Henry Kissinger Professor, em.Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration StudiesRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat Bonn;
  • Hans Blix, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, former IAEA Director General, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC);
  • Dieter Boden, Ambassador (ret), Potsdam;
  • Michael Boyce, Former Chief of the Defence Staff and First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy; a cross bench member of the the British House of Lords;
  • Ulrich J. Brandenburg, German Ambassador to NATO (2007-2010), German Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2010-2014);
  • Karl-Heinz Brunner, Member of Parliament, Spokesman on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
  • Corentin Brustlein, Director of the Center for Security Studies, France
  • Philip Breedlove*, USAF General retired. Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, former US European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
  • Des Browne, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN), Vice Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Convener of the TLG and former UK Defence Secretary
  • Denis Bukonkin*, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Research Center, Minsk; Belorussia;
  • William J. Burns, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Deputy Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Russia;
  • Evgeniy Buzhinsky*, Lieutenant General (ret.), Vice President of the Russian International Affairs Council; Chairman, Executive Board, PIR Center;
  • Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of the Joint Defence Staff, Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Italy;
  • Samuel Charap*, former Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2011-2012;
  • Pierce Corden*, former head of the department of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, research fellow at the Center for science, technologies and security policy;
  • Thomas Countryman*, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chairman of the Arms Control Association;
  • Dmitry Danilov*, Head of Department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS);
  • Christopher Davis*, Professorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford;
  • Lewis Dunn*, former U.S. Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
  • Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Danish Foreign Minister (1982-1993);
  • Victor Esin*, Colonel General (ret.), Former Head of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Marc Finaud*, Head of Arms Proliferation and Diplomatic Tradecraft, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy;
  • Ute Finckh-Kraemer, former Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation; Alumna of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (PNND);
  • Cornelius Friesendorf, Head, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
  • Helmut W. Ganser, Brigadier-General (ret), Defence Advisor to the German NATO Delegation 2004-2008, Brussels;
  • Rainer L. Glatz, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Commander German Armed Forces Joint Force Command, Potsdam;
  • Valery Garbuzov, Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Francois Le Goff, General Secretary of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
  • Thomas Gomart, Director, Institut frangais des relations internationales (IFRI);
  • Alexander Graef, Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
  • Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform (CER), UK;
  • Philippe Greciano, Professor at Grenoble Alpes University, Jean Monnet Chair, Member of the Center for International Security and EU Cooperation, France;
  • Alexey Gromyko**, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Wolfgang Guensche, LtColonel (ret), former Head of Arms Control Unit, German Armed Forces Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen; former military advisor to the German Foreign Office on security, arms control and disarmament;
  • David Hannay, Former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN; current Chair of UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation in the UK Parliament;
  • Ruediger Hartmann, Ambassador (ret), former Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
  • Benjamin Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow at Fondation pour la recherche strategique (FRS);
  • Frangois Heisbourg, Chairman and Special Advisor, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) / Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), France;
  • Kurt Herrmann, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Head NATO Military Liaison Mission (MLM), Moscow, and former Director NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA);
  • Sven Hirdman, Ambassador to Russia 1994-2004, State Secretary Ministry of Defence of Sweden (1979-1982);
  • Matthias Hoehn, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
  • Hellmut Hoffmann, Ambassador (ret), former Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament (2009-2013);
  • Heiner Horsten, Ambassador (ret), Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna 2008-2012;
  • Hans Huebner, Brigadier-General (ret), former Director, German Arms Control Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen;
  • Hans-Dieter Heumann, Ambassador (ret.), former President of Federal College for Security Policy, Berlin;
  • Jon Huntsman, former Governor of Utah, former Ambassador of the United States to Russia, to China and to Singapore;
  • Igor Istomin, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied International Political Analysis, MGIMO University;
  • Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-2004), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2004-2007), President of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC);
  • Juhani Kaskeala, Senior Finnish Admiral and former Chief of Defence of the Finnish Defence Forces (2001-2009);
  • Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association;
  • Michael Kofman*, Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center;
  • Bert Koenders, Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands;
  • Lawrence Korb*, US Navy Captain (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reagan Administration, Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Senior Advisor, Defense Information Center;
  • Andrey Kortunov*, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council;
  • Oleg Krivolapov*, Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Evgeniy Kozhokin, Dean of School of International Relations and Regional Studies of the State University for Humanitarian Studies;
  • Ulrich Kuehn, Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
  • Valentin Kuznetsov*, Vice Admiral (ret.), former Chief Military Representative of the RF at NATO, Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Henrik Larsen, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH ZQrich);
  • Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor, Columbia University;
  • Imants Liegis, Latvian Ambassador to France and to Hungary, Latvia’s Defense Minister (2009-2010) and the Acting Minister of Justice (2009-2010);
  • Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
  • Mogens Lykketof, former Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Parliament, Denmark. Former President of the United Nations General Assembly (2015-2016), Denmark;
  • Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to the Russian Federation;
  • Ruediger Luedeking, Ambassador (ret), former Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
  • Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the United States (1992-1994), director on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the RF;
  • Douglas Lute*, Lieutenant General (rt.), US Ambassador to NATO, 2013-2017, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University;
  • Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow at FRS;
  • Michael Maclay, Chairman of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
  • Janos Martonyi, Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Hungary;
  • John McColl, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and Lieutenant-Governor of Jersey, UK;
  • Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
  • Giles Merritt, Founder and Chairman, Friends of Europe;
  • Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, Senior Analyst for Russia and Eurasia, Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Spain;
  • Victor Mizin*, Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
  • Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Executive chairman of Institut frangais des relations internationales (IFRI);
  • Klaus Naumann, General (ret), former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces); Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999);
  • Alexander Nikitin*, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Honorary President of the Russian Association of Political Science;
  • Bernard Norlain, General (ret), former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force;
  • Joseph Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Under Secretary of State, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government;
  • Olga Oliker*, Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group;
  • Sergey Oznobishev*, Head, Department of Military and Political Analysis and Research Projects, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
  • William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense, Director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC, FSI Senior Fellow;
  • Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations,India and Russia;
  • Steven Pifer*, former US Ambassador to Ukraine, William Perry research fellow at Stanford University and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution;
  • William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Foreign Member to the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Pavel Palazhchenko*, Head of the International Relations, the Gorbachev Foundation;
  • Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence of Italy; Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee;
  • Solomon Passy, former Chairman of the United Nations Security Council, former Bulgarian Foreign Minister;
  • Friedrich W. Ploeger, Lieutenant-General (ret), German Airforce, former Deputy Commander AIRCOM Ramstein (2010-2013);
  • Ruprecht Polenz, President German Association for East European Studies, former Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German Bundestag
  • Paul Quiles, President of the Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN). Former Defence Minister and former President of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly of France;
  • Alain Richard, French Senator; Defence Minister of France (1997-2002);
  • David Richards, General (ret), former Chief of the Defence Staff, member of the UK House of Lords;
  • Wolfgang Richter*, Colonel (ret.), Senior Military Advisor of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna (2005-2009); Senior Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (SWP)
  • Malcolm Rifkind, Former Conservative MP in the UK Parliament, former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former British Defence Secretary and former Foreign Secretary;
  • Cynthia Roberts*, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College,City University of New York, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University, policy adviser, Joint Staff, US Department of Defense, 2019;
  • George Robertson, Former NATO Secretary General; Former UK Secretary of State for Defence;
  • Sergey Rogov**, Academic Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), Chairman of the International Security Advisory Board of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Kevin Ryan*, Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Member of the US-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, former Defense Attache at the US embassy in Russia, Brigadier General;
  • Laetitia Saint-Paul, French Politician and Vice President of the National Assembly;
  • Pavel Sharikov*, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Igor Sherbak, former First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the RF at the United Nations, Research Fellow Chief the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Robby Schlund, Head of German-Russian Parliament Group, Deutscher Bundestag;
  • Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Senior Associate Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF);
  • Reiner Schwalb, Brigadier-General (ret), National German Representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk/VA, 2007-2010; German Senior Defense Official and Attache to the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011-2018;
  • Vladimir Senko, former Foreign Minister of Belarus; Former Ambassador of Belarus to the United Kingdom.;
  • Stefano Silvestri, Senior Scientific Advisor at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), former Under Secretary of State for Defence, former President of IAI (2001-2013);
  • Hartwig Spitzer, Professor, Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg;
  • Michael Staack, Professor, Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Armed Forces in Germany, Hamburg;
  • Armin Staigis, Brigadier-General (ret), former Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin;
  • Stefano Stefanini, former Permanent Representative to NATO, Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy;
  • Angela Stent, professor, Georgetown University;
  • Nataliya Stepanova* Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Goran Svilanovic, Former Secretary General, Regional Cooperation Council, Serbia;
  • Strobe Talbott, Distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Deputy Secretary of State (1994-2001), President of the Brookings Institution (2002-2017);
  • John Tefft, former US Ambassador to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Lithuania
  • Greg Thielmann*, Board member of the Arms Control Association, Commissioner of the U.S.-Russian-German “Deep Cuts” Project;
  • Adam Thomson*, Director of the European Leadership Network, Permanent UK Representative to NATO (2014-2016);
  • Alexander Tikhansky, military-political analyst (Belarus), professor of the Academy of Military Science of Russia;
  • Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy, Special Adviser to EU High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell;
  • Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1996­2000), Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation (2000-2004), Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of W orld Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
  • Vygaudas Usackas*, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Lithuanian ambassador to USA, Mexico and UK as well as EU ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan, Member of the Board of Directors of Avia Solutions Group;
  • Alexander Vershbow*, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former US Ambassador to South Korea, NATO, Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council;
  • Karsten D. Voigt, former Member of Parliament and President of the NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, former German-American Coordinator in the German Federal Foreign Office;
  • Fedor Voytolovsky, Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Andrew Weber, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Senior Fellow, Council on Strategic Risks.
  • Igor Yurgens*, President of the All-Russian Insurance Association, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs;
  • Andrey Zagorskiy*, Head, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO);
  • Dr Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow and former Deputy Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
  • Valery Zhuravel, Colonel (ret), chief adviser of the Department of International Security of the Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2009-2014), head of the Center for Arctic Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Vitaliy Zhurkin, Director Emeritus, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
  • Pavel Zolotarev*, Major General (ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
  • Vladislav Zubok, professor, London School of Economics.
  • Per Carlsen, former Assistant Secretary of Defence (Denmark), Former Ambassador to Vilnius, Moscow and Riga

 

* - Members of the expert group
** - Co-chairs of the expert group

 

 
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